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Mobility Sharing as a Preference Matching Problem
Hongmou Zhang and Jinhua Zhao
Abstract—Traffic congestion, dominated by single-occupancy
vehicles, reflects not only transportation system inefficiency and
negative externalities, but also a sociological state of human isola-
tion. Advances in information and communication technology are
enabling the growth of real-time ridesharing to improve system
efficiency. While most ridesharing algorithms optimize fellow pas-
senger matching based on efficiency criteria (maximum number
of paired trips, minimum total vehicle-time or vehicle-distance
traveled), very few explicitly consider passengers’ preference for
their peers as the matching objective. Existing literature ei-
ther considers the bipartite driver–passenger matching problem,
which is structurally different from the monopartite passenger–
passenger matching, or only considers the passenger–passenger
problem in a simplified one-origin–multiple-destination setting.
We formulate a general monopartite passenger matching model
in a road network, and illustrate the model by pairing 301,430
taxi trips in Manhattan in two scenarios: one considering 1,000
randomly generated preference orders, and the other considering
four sets of group-based preference orders. In both scenarios,
compared with efficiency-based matching models, preference-
based matching improves the average ranking of paired fellow
passenger to the near-top position of people’s preference orders
with only a small efficiency loss at the individual level, and
a moderate loss at the aggregate level. The near-top-ranking
results fall in a narrow range even with the random variance of
passenger preference as inputs.
Index Terms—mobility sharing, matching, preference, social
interaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONLINE mobility on demand (MoD) services emergingwith the advance of modern information technology
enrich peoples’ transportation mode choices. Ridesharing is
an MoD service that connects the trips of passengers who
can combine their trips with only small increases in travel
time, such that a single vehicle can accommodate more than
one passenger at a time. Examples of ridesharing services
include Lyft Line, UberPool, and GrabHitch. By increasing the
occupancy of vehicles, ridesharing has the potential to reduce
the number of cars on roads, leading to reduction in traffic
congestion and pollution. Lyft reported in 2014 that over fifty
percent of their trips in San Francisco, and thirty percent in
New York City were shared trips [1].
The current paradigm of mobility sharing is focused on
optimizing system efficiency. The underlying assumption is
that travelers place no value on the characteristics of their
fellow passengers, or if they do, the relative importance is
negligible compared to travel time and cost. Researchers have
proposed various algorithms to maximize these efficiency
benefits with different optimization objectives under different
assumptions [2]–[7], and have carried out simulations with
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real-world data [8]. In the proposed algorithms, trip pairing
is modeled as a graph-matching problem, and with different
matching strategies, system optimization can be achieved. In
a recent study, Alonso-Mora et al. investigated the minimum
number of vehicles that would be needed by New York City
if sharing possibility was optimized [6].
Whereas the efficiency benefits of ridesharing have been
extensively studied, ridesharing is less understood as a socio-
logical phenomenon [9]. In contrast to typical social interac-
tions in public or private spaces (meeting rooms, streets, public
squares, living rooms, etc.), the nature of shared car rides is
impromptu, captive for a considerable duration, and remark-
ably more intimate—representing a unique juxtaposition of
spontaneity and intensity. It is also distinct from mass transit
modes such as buses and trains, in which most passengers
refrain from engaging each other. For example, Uber promotes
their UberPool service as a potential platform for business and
job opportunities by meeting new people [10].
In previous studies, researchers have used preference to
match drivers and passengers [11], [12], and formulated
ridesharing as a bipartite matching problem, taking drivers and
passengers as two separate sets of nodes. The mathematical
structures of monopartite and bipartite matchings are different
[13], [14]. For example, there is guaranteed to be stable
solutions for bipartite matching problems, but there may not
exist any stable solution for a monopartite matching problem.
Therefore, the driver–passenger matching problem and the
fellow passenger matching problem are not only operationally
different, but also observe different system structures. Fur-
thermore, these studies only considered travel distances and
financial costs of trips to represent preference and may thus
underestimate the variation and complexity of user preference
resulting from social factors.
Thaithatkul et al. conducted the first research on using
preference for fellow passengers matching [15], [16], and con-
sidered trip distance and randomly-generated personal utility
for fellow passenger preference. They implemented the model
in a one-origin–multiple-destination setting, using artificially
generated trip features and synthetic preferences. The one-
origin–multiple-destination setting is applicable to real-world
scenarios such as trips from an airport, but does not capture the
shareability of the general multiple-origin–multiple-destination
situations. In this paper, we propose a more generic preference-
based fellow passenger matching model, and examine the
model properties with empirical taxi trips and the road network
in Manhattan.
Berlingerio et al. quantified the enjoyability of passengers
based on people’s interests, social links, and tendency to
connect to people with similar or dissimilar interests, mined
from social network data, and formulated enjoyability to-
gether with the number of cars as a multi-objective linear
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programming problem [17]. Enjoyability is closely related
to but different from preference, and the linear additivity of
enjoyability of people does not fit in our paper, where we use
Pareto comparison instead of quantified enjoyability.
Preference matching originated from, and has been widely
studied in the context of college admission, marriage, room-
mate assignment, doctor residency assignment, and kidney ex-
change [13], [18]–[20]. Each of these problems is one case of
matching people to people, or people to institution—students
to colleges, doctors to hospitals, or kidney donors to receivers.
Furthermore, in each of the settings, each individual—either
person or institute—is assumed to have, explicitly or latently,
a ranking of objects or people representing their preference.
Within such a system, a stable outcome is expected, and can
be achieved regarding the preference of all individuals in
the system. A stable matching is a matching with which no
individual could be better off by changing the match without
making at least one other individual worse off. In other words,
a stable matching is an optimal matching in a socially Pareto
sense.
In our paper, we explicitly consider passengers’ preference
for their fellow passengers as the trip matching objective,
formulate ridesharing as a monopartite preference matching
problem, and compare the matching outcome with those
of efficiency-based methods. We use 301,430 taxi trips in
Manhattan [21] (Fig. 1) on a randomly selected day in 2011
(April 24) to illustrate the model: a single set of passengers
are paired with each other, and a maximum stable matching
as the pairing objective is identified with regard to all pas-
sengers’ preferences for their peers. We quantify the trade-
off between efficiency-based ridesharing methods, and our
proposed preference-based matching method.
We note that matching people with preferences and the
elicitation of preferences are two distinct tasks. In this paper,
we take preferences for fellow passengers as given in the form
of rank orders, but do not address the issues of the preference
elicitation. The matching algorithm we propose can operate
with any complete or partial preference orders. At the end
of this paper, we discuss the complexity in the preference
for fellow passengers and its difference from the preference
for other trip attributes. The complexity of preference for
fellow passengers exists in its structure—being heterogeneous,
dynamic, and more about compatibility than similarity—and
in its elicitation. In the discussion section we propose possible
preference elicitation methods with associated challenges.
We also emphasize that not all preferences are respectable.
[22] and [23] demonstrated the ethical concerns surrounding
ridesharing. Although an ethical discussion of preference in
ridesharing is beyond the scope of this paper, we want to point
out that it is critical for the society as a whole to draw the
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable articulations of
preferences. A positive understanding of the role of preference
in ridesharing is an important prerequisite for addressing those
concerns.
II. METHODS
Formally, we consider the vehicle trips in a city to be
in a shareability network [5]. A shareability network is an
Origin
	1	-	29	
	29	-	72	
	72	-	119	
	119	-	174	
	174	-	239	
	239	-	318	
	318	-	427	
	427	-	604	
	604	-	1,166	
	1,166	-	1,983	
Destination
	1	-	29	
	29	-	72	
	72	-	123	
	123	-	184	
	184	-	272	
	272	-	377	
	377	-	499	
	499	-	910	
	910	-	1,812	
	1,812	-	2,337	
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the origins and destinations of taxi trips in Manhattan
and distribution of trip duration without sharing
undirected graph G(V,E) where each node in the node set V
represents a trip, and E = {{vi, vj}|vi, vj ∈ V } is the edge
set indicating whether two trips are shareable. For example,
for trips vi, vj ∈ V , if vi and vj can be shared, we have
{vi, vj} ∈ E. The criterion used to determine whether two
trips are shareable in this paper follows the “cap of maximal
detour” rule [5]. Two trips are shareable if there exists a new
route that can connect the origins and destinations of the two
trips, and the additional travel time for either trip does not
increase more than ∆t, a predetermined parameter set by the
system designer. In other words, in a shareability network with
parameter ∆t, if a trip would take a person time t to travel
individually, the travel time would never be more than t+ ∆t
if the trip is shared with another allowed trip. In the scope of
this paper, we limit our discussion to the ridesharing of two
parties of passengers.
The departure and arrival time constraints are also consid-
ered when building the shareability network. For any trip pairs,
if the actual departure time of any of the two when sharing
is later than the original departure time without sharing plus
∆t, the trip pair is considered non-shareable, and similarly for
arrival time [5].
Therefore, detour time and waiting time, or the difference
between the original departure time without sharing and the
pick-up time with sharing are unified as ∆t, or the “passenger
discomfort parameter”, in the configuration of shareability
networks. In other words, if two trips are shareable, neither
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the detour time of each party, nor the difference between the
actual pick-up time of the shared trip and the original departure
time can be greater than ∆t.
Fig. 2 illustrates the distribution of node degree of the share-
ability network built on the taxi trips in Manhattan in one day.
For example, when ∆t is 300 seconds, the majority of trips
have approximately 100 shareable trips, and the maximum
number of shareable trips that a trip has is approximately 900.
Both numbers increase with ∆t as sharing possibility increases
with longer allowed detours.
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Fig. 2. Frequency of the number of shareable trips with a trip in shareability
networks with ∆t = 100–600 s (each point represents the frequency of trips
with a certain number of shareable trips)
Upon the shareability network, we define a weight function
ω : E → R indicating the efficiency benefits of sharing two
trips. In this paper, we use the savings of vehicle-minutes (veh-
min) and vehicle-kilometers-traveled (VKT) as the measures
ω of efficiency. The travel time on each road link is estimated
using the real-world taxi travel time data, and the travel route
of each trip is inferred as the one with the closest total travel
time to the actual time [5]. In this paper, we assume that
the sharing of trips does not change the overall underlying
traffic condition, i.e., we do not consider the feedback between
traffic congestion and ridesharing, which is an important future
research direction when the shared trips start to contribute to
a high proportion of the overall traffic.
We then consider the preference of the passenger in each
trip for all other passengers. As discussed by [24] and [25], the
reasons for a passenger preferring a certain fellow passenger
to another vary. Here, we take the preferences as exogenous
inputs to the problem, and the matching algorithm we develop
can operate given any preference rank order.
If a shared trip consists only of individual passengers, the
preference is individual preference. In other cases where there
are more than one passenger in a party, we assume that all the
passengers in the party are able to consent on an order; thus,
we can consider each party equivalent to a single passenger.
In the remainder of this paper, we treat trips and passengers
as equal. Hence, for passenger vi in V , his/her preference
can be denoted as an ordered list vi : vk1  vk2  . . . 
vkm , where k1, k2, . . . , km is the permutation of a sublist of
{1, 2, . . . , n}\i, and n is the number of passengers in the
system.
Note that the preference list for a passenger does not have
to be a complete list containing all other passengers in the
system, but only needs to contain all the shareable passengers,
or the “neighbors” in G(V,E). Nevertheless, we need to
require that the preference lists be symmetrically compatible—
if passenger vi is on passenger vj’s list, passenger vj also
needs to be on passenger vi’s list.
A matching M is a subset of E, and it requires that ∀ei, ej ∈
M, ei ∩ ej = ∅ such that no passenger is sharing with more
than one other passenger. We denote the set of all feasible
matchings of a shareability network G as M(G). A stable
matching is a special matching M ′ such that there are no two
passengers in the system who both prefer each other to their
paired fellow passengers, or formally @ei = {vi1 , vi2}, ej =
{vj1 , vj2} ∈ M ′, vi1 : vj1  vi2 and vj1 : vi1  vj2 . The set
of stable matchings is denoted as M′(G) ⊂M(G).
Gale and Shapley found that for such a system, referred to as
the “stable roommate problem,” a stable matching consisting
of all passengers does not always exist [13]. Irving proposed
a method that finds a stable matching if one exists [20]. When
there is no stable matching for all people in the system, an
alternative objective is to find a stable matching on a maximum
subset of V —a “maximum stable matching” [14]—and Tan
proposed an algorithm to find such a solution [26]. Therefore,
we can look for the matching that is stable on the subset of
V with maximal cardinality:
Mpref = argmax
M∈M′(G)
{|M |} . (1)
Because there may be more than one such matching, Mpref
can be a subset instead of a single element in M.
Further, we wish to determine the efficiency trade-off arising
from the use of stable-preference matching; therefore, we com-
pare it with two efficiency-based matching methods, maximum
cardinality matching (MC), which maximizes the number of
shared trips (n(shared trips)), and maximum weight matching
(MW), which minimizes total system veh-min or VKT:
Mmc = argmax
M∈M(G)
{|M |} , (2)
Mmw = argmax
M∈M(G)
{∑
e∈M
ω(e)
}
. (3)
As M′ ⊂ M, ∀M ′ ∈ Mpref and M ∈ Mmc, there always is
|M ′| 6 |M |.
A. Synthetic preference orders
We use two types of preference inputs in this paper. 1)
Random preference orders: for each node in the shareability
network, we generated a random permutation of all the neigh-
boring nodes and used the permutation as the preference order.
We repeated the random permutation assignment 1,000 times
to generate sufficient randomness in people’s preference for
others, and delineated the range of possible results, which
turned out to be very narrow. 2) Group-based preference
orders: we acknowledge that various factors can be related
to people’s preference for fellow passengers, ranging from
gender, age, and income level, to personal interest, political af-
filiation, hobbies, and talkativeness; therefore, we implemented
group-based preference assuming that each passenger belongs
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to one of two groups based on one binary characteristic. S1–S4
are four scenarios that test different group shares, and different
preference symmetricity assumptions between groups.
S0. One group: randomly assigned preference orders;
S1. Even, symmetric: 50% of passengers in Group 1, 50% in
Group 2; people in both groups prefer fellow passengers
from their own group to those from the other;
S2. Even, asymmetric: 50% of passengers in Group 1, 50%
in Group 2; people in Group 1 prefer fellow passengers
from their own group to those from Group 2, whereas
people in Group 2 are indifferent;
S3. Uneven, symmetric: 20% of passengers in Group 1,
80% in Group 2; people in both groups prefer fellow
passengers from their own group to those from the other;
S4. Uneven, asymmetric: 20% of passengers in Group 1,
80% in Group 2; people in Group 1 prefer fellow
passengers from their own group to those from Group
2, whereas people in Group 2 are indifferent;
We first randomly assigned trips into two groups based on
the group share hyperparamter. We assumed that both groups
are evenly distributed in space. Then, for each group, we
assigned preference based on the group type. For groups in
which people prefer same-group fellow passengers, we first
determined whether the neighboring nodes were in the same
group or the other group, and carried out random permutation
on each of the two neighbor sets. We concatenated the two
permuted lists as the preference lists. In Appendix A, the order
of magnitude of the number of preference possibilities and the
reduction of possibilities when groups exist are discussed.
We acknowledge that in a real-world ridesharing platform
it is impossible to ask users to rank all the possible fellow
passengers. This paper focuses on the matching process but
not the the preference elicitation process. We develop a general
matching algorithm which can operate given any complete or
partial preference rank orders. In addition the complete or
partial rank orders for fellow passengers do not have to be
explicitly given by the users, but may also be derived based
on user behaviors, travel history, or relevant information that
the users provided to the service provider. We will comment on
both the potential technical and ethical issues in the discussion
section.
B. Irving–Tan algorithm
We build our stable-preference matching model following
the Irving–Tan algorithm [20], [26]. There are two steps in
the algorithm. In the first step (Algorithm 1), each passenger
proposes to the top choice in their preference lists, and the
proposed passenger could either hold the proposal if there
is no better choice, or reject the proposal if a better choice
is already present. If a passenger accepts a proposal while
holding another proposal, the passenger rejects the originally
held proposal. The rejected passenger will then have to re-
propose. The process is repeated until each passenger is
accepted by another passenger, or the preference list has been
exhausted.
After the preference list reduction, the preference lists are
significantly reduced. By symmetricity of each operation in
Algorithm 1 Preference list reduction: proposal and rejection
1: for each passenger vi ∈ V do
2: propose to the first one in the preference list
3: if the proposed passenger does not have a better option
then
4: hold the proposal
5: else
6: reject the proposal and delete each other in the
preference lists
7: end if
8: while rejected or preference list is not empty do
9: propose to the next one
10: end while
11: end for
12: for each passenger vi ∈ V do
13: delete all the choices with rankings larger than the
proposal it holds
14: end for
step one, if there is only one fellow passenger vj left in
passenger vi’s preference list, vi should also be the only one
left in vj’s preference list. Therefore, for the passengers with
reduced preference lists of length zero or one, the matching
is complete. For passengers with preference lists of length at
least two, there must be “rotations” that include at least three
passengers. In the second step of the algorithm (Algorithm
2), one rotation is identified in each iteration. A rotation
corresponds to a subset of the shareability network, in which
the matching solution will be local to the nodes within it and
independent of the rest of the graph. In other words, as long
as a rotation R is identified from the network, the problem
can be divided into a matching m1 on R and a matching m2
on G\R, and the overall matching will be m = m1 ∪m2.
There are two types of rotations, odd rotation and non-odd
rotation. An odd rotation is a rotation with an odd number of
elements. For example, consider the following case, in which
no stable matching exists for all four elements.
1: 2  3  4
2: 3  1  4
3: 1  2  4
4: 1  2  3
After step one, the preference lists will be reduced to the
following table, and {1, 2, 3} can be found as an odd rotation.
1: 2  3
2: 3  2
3: 1  2
4: ∅
To find a maximum stable matching for an odd rotation, one
element needs to be eliminated from the list randomly [26].
In the other type of rotation, the non-odd rotation, there is an
even number of elements. For example, in the following case,
{1, 2, 4, 3} is a non-odd rotation. In this case, the rotation can
be further removed from the preference lists as described by
[20] and [26]. After all rotations have been removed from the
preference lists, each person should hold at most one choice in
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1: 2  4  3
2: 4  1
3: 1  4
4: 3  1  2
Algorithm 2 Matching with the reduced preference lists
1: while there is rotation in the preference lists do
2: if it is an odd rotation then
3: Randomly delete an element from the odd rotation
4: m1 = matching(the odd rotation \ the deleted
element)
5: m2 = matching(the rest of the preference lists)
6: return m1 + m2
7: else
8: delete the rotation from the preference lists
9: end if
10: end while
the corresponding preference list, which gives the maximum
stable matching. The time complexity of this algorithm is
O(n2) [26].
For the efficiency-based matching methods, we used the
Python package NetworkX [27] for the maximum cardinality
matching, and simple greedy algorithm for the maximum
weight matching. The algorithm keeps pairing nodes with the
highest weighted edges until no further matches can be made.
III. RESULTS
First, we conducted the efficiency-based and preference-
based matchings for the shareability network of taxi trips in
one day in Manhattan with ∆t = 300 s, and repeated the
test for 1,000 random preference assignments to show the
variability of the results. The solution time for each run was
about eight minutes. Second, in order to estimate the impact of
∆t on the convergence of preference matching, we performed
sensitivity analysis for preference-based matching with a range
of ∆t = 100–600 s for 1,000 runs each. Third, for each
of the four two-group scenarios, we conducted preference-
based matching for 100 structured random assignments of
preference.
A. Efficiency vs. preference
Table I summarizes the efficiency measures under different
matchings. The table shows that preference-based matching
results in only a marginally lower matching rate than MC
matching. Further, the rate is 3.8% higher than those of
MW matchings. For other efficiency measures, system-wise
preference-based matching behaves similar to MC matching
and has longer distances and travel times for each vehicle
trip on average. However, for each individual passenger, the
difference in travel time under preference-based matching and
MW matchings is only about 40 seconds. Fig. 4 shows more
details of the efficiency trade-off from a passenger’s perspec-
tive. Fig. 4a shows the distribution of increase in travel time
(detour); preference-based matching has more long detours
than MW matchings, with all detours still capped by ∆t.
Fig. 4b depicts the cumulative distribution of the detour time
as a proportion of the total travel time if the trip is not shared.
MW matchings have 96.8% trips with detour of less than 10%
of the non-sharing travel time, whereas for preference-based
matching, the number is still as high as 92.8%.
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Fig. 3. Ranking of paired fellow passengers in respective passengers’
preference lists (left y-axis). The darker dots show the average values of
results, and the lighter dots are the 5th and 95th-percentile values; The three
efficiency-based matchings almost overlap; Degree distribution: the frequency
of the number of shareable trips of a given trip (right y-axis), a replicate of
the ∆t = 300 s curve of Fig. 2 for reference.
Fig. 3 shows the performance of the matchings in terms
of preference. The y-axis on the left, in logarithmic scale,
shows the ranking of the actually paired fellow passenger
in the corresponding passenger’s preference list, averaged
across 1,000 runs, with regard to the x-axis—the number of
shareable trips that the passenger has. For example, under
both MC and MW matchings, for all passengers with 100
shareable fellow passengers, the average ranking of matched
passengers are their 50th preferred choices, whereas under
preference-based matching, the average ranking is slightly
more than 10. The curves of both MC and MW approximate
k/2, where k is the number of shareable fellow passengers—
on average efficiency-based matchings pair a passenger to an
average preferred fellow passenger as we assume preference
is independent of space and time. Preference-based matching
asymptotically approaches the tenth most favorable choice
even with a k as large as several hundreds.
In the mean values and the gap between the 5th and
95th percentiles in Fig. 3, the range of results is very narrow
across 1,000 repeat tests with randomly generated preferences,
especially when the number of shareable trips is not suffi-
ciently large. For example, for passengers with 300 shareable
trips, the average rankings of their mean, 5th, and 95th-
percentile-matched fellow passengers are 13.8, 12.6, and 15,
respectively. The narrow range indicates that this near-top
pairing performance is not dependent on specific preference
orders.
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TABLE I
EFFICIENCY MEASURES FOR EFFICIENCY-BASED MODELS AND PREFERENCE-BASED MODEL (∆t = 300 S)
No sharing† Max. n(shared trips)matching (MC)
Min. veh-min
matching (MW1)
Min. VKT
matching (MW2)
Preference-based
matching
Avg. number of matched trips 0 297,818 (98.8%) 285,856 (94.8%) 285,902 (94.8%) 297,049.5 (98.6%)
Total system veh-min 2,686,933 2,391,910 1,689,484 1,689,465 2,341,199
Total system VKT 885,536 788,132 558,415 558,388 771,942
Veh-min per trip 8.91 7.94 5.60 5.60 7.77
VKT per trip 2.94 2.61 1.85 1.85 2.56
Passenger travel time per trip (min) 8.91 12.15 11.42 11.42 12.14
Total number of trips 301,430
Trips with at least one shareable trips 300,776 (99.8%)
†Assuming there is only one passenger in each trip.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of increase in travel time for all matched passengers under different matching methods (a) and empirical cumulative distribution of the
percentage of increase in travel time in the travel time without sharing (b)
0 100 200 300 400 500
Run index
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Av
g.
 ra
nk
 o
f p
ai
re
d 
fe
llo
w 
pa
ss
en
ge
r
2.55
2.552
2.554
2.556
2.558
2.56
2.562
2.564
2.566
2.568
2.57
VK
T 
pe
r t
rip
Trips with 10 shareable trips
Trips with 50 shareable trips
Trips with 100 shareable trips
Trips with 500 shareable trips
VKT per trip
Fig. 5. Stability analysis of matching results
B. Result stability analysis
Since there is randomness in the preference–matching algo-
rithm, we need to understand the stability of matching results
in both the efficiency aspect and the preference aspect. To
this end we ran the matching algorithm with fixed inputs of
preference orders for 500 times, and eliminated odd-rotation
elements randomly in each run. As shown in Fig. 5 both the
efficiency performance of the algorithm, such as the VKT
saving per trip, and preference performance, i.e., the average
ranking of paired passengers for those with the same number
of shareable trips are very stable across runs (four represen-
tative results are shown—the paired passenger’s ranking for
trips with 10, 50, 100, 500 shareable trips), and the ranges
of variance of results are small. For VKT per trip, the range
between the maximum value and the minimum value of results
in the 500 runs is 2.4×10−4, and for rankings of paired fellow
passengers, the variance across runs is much smaller than one
rank step in preference.
C. Sensitivity analysis for ∆t
While considering five minutes (300 s) as a meaningful
detour cap for shared trips, we are also interested in the impact
of ∆t on the performance of the preference-based matching
model.
Fig. 6 shows the results of preference-based matching with
∆t from 100 s to 600 s. In Fig. 6a, the shapes of the curves are
similar but the curves have different values. In the shareability
network with a larger ∆t, the average ranking of paired fellow
passenger is worse for trips with a given number of shareable
trips. For example, for trips with 200 shareable trips, with ∆t
= 200 s, the average ranking of paired fellow passenger is 9.4,
whereas for ∆t = 400 s, the ranking is 16.8, and for ∆t = 600
s it is 20.3. However, it is worth noting that the trips with 200
shareable trips are no longer the same in the three cases. For
any given trip, the larger ∆t is, the more shareable trips it will
have. This explains why the curves stretch to the right as ∆t
increases.
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Further, as ∆t keeps increasing, the gap between curves
becomes increasingly smaller—leading us to expect a limiting
curve when ∆t→∞. This is because when ∆t is sufficiently
large, i.e., when very long detours are allowed, most trips
are shareable with each other, and the shareability network
becomes very dense, which eventually becomes a complete
graph. In other words, all trips are shareable if no detour
limit is applied. Increasing ∆t at this time does not add
any shareability, thus the curve reaches the limit position.
Therefore, while increasing ∆t makes the ranking worse, it
has a limit.
At the same time, although in an absolute sense the ranking
gets worse as ∆t increases, the ranking still gets better
relatively, as shown in Fig. 6b. In this graph, the ranking is
normalized by the number of shareable passengers, and the
number of shareable trips is normalized by the highest number
of shareable trips in the graph. For example, if we denote
the largest number of shareable trips that a passenger has as
K, when ∆t = 100 s, the people who have 20%K shareable
trips will be paired with their top 21.6% preferred fellow
passengers, whereas for ∆t = 300 s, the ranking improves
to the top 8%, and for ∆t = 600 s, it further improves to the
top 4.5%.
D. Two-group scenarios
Table II and Fig. 7 summarize the results for preference-
based matching under the four two-group scenarios with the
one-group scenario S0 for reference. For scenarios S1–S4, the
efficiency measures show that the preference for a specific
subgroup of fellow passengers leads to fewer shared trips.
The comparison between the symmetric scenarios (S1, S3) and
asymmetric scenarios (S2, S4) show that the more people there
holding group-based preferences, the lower the probability of
sharing will be. However, the greatest difference between any
two scenarios is only 1.1%.
Comparing the same-group pairing rates, in S2 we find that
the groups that are indifferent (G2) have slightly lower chances
of being paired with same-group passengers. Moreover, in S3
and S4, the chance of being paired with passengers from the
same group is lower for the “minority” group (G1), even if the
majority group is indifferent, although the difference is only
3–4%, and considering the group splits, 20% and 80%.
From Fig. 7, it is clear that the average ranking of paired
fellow passenger is worse when both groups prefer to be paired
with passengers from the same group (S1, S3), compared to
if only one group does (S2, S4). However, this difference
diminishes when the group split is uneven, as the gap between
the curves of S3 and S4 is smaller than that of S1 and S2.
The best-performing preference matching is observed in the
even-group symmetric scenario (S1).
IV. DISCUSSION
This paper formulated the passenger matching in a mo-
bility sharing system as a monopartite matching problem,
and examined the trade-off between this matching model
with that arising from efficiency-based matching models. The
results show that with only a small efficiency loss at the
individual level, and a moderate one at the aggregate level,
the improvement in preference ranking is substantial—from
the average to the near-top. We also found that increases in
the detour cap ∆t lead to slightly—and boundedly—worse
preference rankings in absolute sense, but to better rankings in
relative sense. Based on the actual context and system design
objective, ridesharing system designers can make the decision
of which matching strategy to use, or how to combine multiple
strategies.
We also modeled a two-group preference structure for
fellow passengers in addition to the simple random case. The
preference for a specific group of fellow passengers leads to
lower pairing rates—the more people holding it, the lower the
pairing rate will be. The same-group pairing rate is lower for
the minority group.
It is important to distinguish the question of obtaining the
ridesharing preferences from the question of developing the
matching algorithm that utilizes such preferences. This paper
focused on the latter question and developed the algorithm
that can generate the optimal matching output with any set
of input preference rank orders. The algorithm is independent
of the input ridesharing preferences. We now comment on the
former question. The challenge of obtaining the ridesharing
preferences of the users is twofold: the complexity in the struc-
ture of preference for fellow passengers, and the complexity
of eliciting such preferences.
We have identified at least three aspects of the structure
of preference for fellow passengers in ridesharing that are
different from the preference for typical travel attributes such
as travel time and travel cost: 1) Heterogeneity—there is
a higher degree of heterogeneity across individuals in the
preference for fellow passengers: some people really enjoy
the shared ride with a fellow passenger while others strongly
prefer riding alone; 2) Dynamism—e.g. even for the same
person he or she may want to be silent in the morning ride
while hope to engage a conversation with a fellow passenger
in the afternoon. The preference for fellow passengers is
dynamic and transient; 3) Compatibility—since the pleasure
or displeasure of a shared ride is a result of the co-production
by fellow passengers, it is more about compatibility between
both passengers than the absolute quality of each individual.
An extreme example is smoking: a smoker may like to be
paired with another smoker, even though smoking per se is a
bad behavior for most people. (Of course smoking is typically
banned in ridesharing in most cities for this example to
be relevant.) Furthermore, compatibility does not necessarily
require similarity. Some people prefer to be paired with people
similar to them, but others may well like being paired with
people different from them.
The elicitation of preference represents another layer of
difficulty. There are several possible approaches to eliciting the
preference for fellow passengers but each has its challenges:
1) directly ask users to identify the characteristics they prefer
to see in their fellow passengers, such as profession, hobby,
personal interests, etc. 2) train a machine learning model with
the characteristics of paired passengers in previous trips and
their post-trip ratings, and 3) start by giving users options
of possible fellow passengers, and train models based on their
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Fig. 6. Average ranking of paired fellow passengers with regard to the number of shareable trips for ∆t = 100–600 s (a: absolute values; b: normalized
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TABLE II
MATCHING RESULTS FOR TWO-GROUP SCENARIOS
Scenario S0 S1 S2 S3 S4
Avg. number of matched trips 297,050(98.6%)
294,494
(97.7%)
296,040
(98.2%)
294,629
(97.7%)
296,530
(98.4%)
Veh-min per trip 7.77 7.77 7.77 7.77 7.77
Paired with passenger in the same group n.a. G1: 97.6%G2: 97.6%
G1: 97.6%
G2: 96.1%
G1: 94.4%
G2: 98.5%
G1: 94.3%
G2: 97.4%
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Fig. 7. Average ranking of paired fellow passenger under two-group scenarios
choices in each trip and their characteristics. There are two dif-
ferent types of challenges: first, passengers may not be able to
articulate the preferences, the descriptions may be ambiguous,
and disparity may exist between what people say and what
they actually do, i.e., between stated preference and revealed
preference (passengers may not want to express their actual
preference for various reasons); second, a deeper challenge
is that certain preferences for fellow passengers may not be
appropriate or respectable, such as discriminatory attitude and
behavior. Such preferences can either be explicitly expressed in
the approach 1 or implicitly embedded in the past behavior and
codified into machine learning algorithms in approaches 2 and
3. There are important questions to be addressed. For example,
what are the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable
preferences? People may see less controversy when gender is
used as a preference factor for security reasons, but race as
a preference factor is definitely unacceptable. Often there are
factors that are acceptable by some but not by others. Who
(or which institutions) shall have the authority to determine
which preference or preference factor is respectable and which
is not? Since the transportation network companies are the
designers of the ridesharing platforms, whether and how they
shall be regulated in this regard? There remains a major gap in
the development of both the social norms and the regulatory
frameworks that can guide the ridesharing behavior and the
associated system and policy design.
The complexity of preference structure and the process of
eliciting preference for fellow passengers demand a thorough
discussion on the behavioral, ethical, and institutional aspects,
and are beyond the scope of this paper. We identify this as a
critical direction for future research.
Further research may also examine 1) the spatial and social
heterogeneity of sharing preferences; 2) the interaction be-
tween ridesharing and congestion; 3) the pricing of ridesharing
services when preference is incorporated; and 4) the vehicle
routing for preference-based ridesharing.
APPENDIX A
UNIVERSE OF PREFERENCE
In the shareability network G(V,E), denote the degree of
v ∈ V as deg(v) = |{u, {u, v} ∈ E}|. Then, the number
of possible permutations as this passenger’s preference for
shareable fellow passengers is deg(v)!. If the preferences
of passengers are independent, the total possible number of
preference assignments is
N =
∏
v∈V
[deg(v)!].
In the two-group scenarios, the preferences of passengers
are not totally independent, but constrained by the group affil-
iation of neighboring nodes. If both groups can be considered
as evenly distributed in space, like the case for gender, the
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 9
expected number of same-group passengers and passengers
of the other group in the neighbors of a node are both
approximately deg(v)/2. Then, if the preference for one group
is always better than that for the other, the total number of
preference assignments would be
N ′ =
∏
v∈V
{[
deg(v)
2
]
!
}2
.
Because when x→ +∞
Γ(x/2)2
Γ(x)
→ 0,
the number of preference possibilities is much smaller than
without group-based preference.
However, the above discussion is under the assumption that
the preferences of passengers are independent, or are only
constrained by group affiliation. In this case, the probability
of each element in this possible set of preferences is uniform.
If the preferences of people are not independent, e.g., some
people are popular among all the others, or some are unwel-
come by all the others, the universe would be much smaller.
When interdependence of preference involves hard constraints,
or some cases in the universe are extremely impossible, the
probability of each preference assignment is stochastic with a
distribution.
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